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Volume 3, Number 7 (May 7, 1998) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Yastrzhembsky completes Kurile tour 
Sergei Yastrzhembsky, demonstrating once again that his role within the 
administration expands well beyond his duties as presidential press spokesman, 
toured the Kurile Islands at Yel'tsin's request in order to dispel "some 
nervousness" of the residents over the future status of the islands. 
Yastrzhembsky reaffirmed the government's position upon completion of his tour, 
claiming "The Kuriles are Russian territories." (ITAR-TASS, 23 Apr 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-113) 
 
Orekhov's insights into government decree process 
In an interview with Moscow News (12-19 Apr 98, No. 14), the head of the 
president's Main State Legal Administration (GGPU), Ruslan Orekhov, described 
a procedure through which "thousands" of government decisions were illegally 
implemented. Beginning in 1991, according to Orekhov, requests to deputy prime 
ministers from various industries, sports groups, or individual supplicants for "the 
transfer of property...as well as tax breaks and exemptions" were resolved 
through individual instructions for action known as "PPs" (expansion unclear, 
possible "on behalf of the government"). The normal procedure for granting such 
requests would require an edict with the signatures of each relevant minister, the 
deputy prime ministers, prime minister and often the president as well. 
 
Tracing the full scope and number of these government instructions would prove 
nearly impossible. As Orekhov notes, "These 'PPs' were never published, despite 
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being the sole grounds for million dollar operations. In theory, they were 
supposed to be registered by the vice premiers' staff, but this is doubtful." 
 
The procedure was formally abolished by a 1994 presidential edict. 
 
Kotenkov foresees conflict this fall 
The president's representative to the State Duma, Aleksandr Kotenkov, believes 
that, while the president's threat to dissolve the Duma may have prevented a 
more prolonged struggle over the government, it will likely rebound to spark 
further confrontation in the Fall. "After its defeat in the latest round of its fight with 
the President, the opposition will try and get its own back in the autumn, when 
the 1999 budget comes for approval," Kotenkov predicted. (ITAR-TASS, 27 Apr 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-117) 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Berezovsky implicates Korzhakov in infamous murder cases 
Billionaire tycoon and recently named Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, Boris Berezovsky, accused the security services of 
involvement in the 1995 murder of Vlad Listev. While Berezovsky himself has 
often been mentioned in connection with Listev's assassination, he now claims to 
have information that "clearly points to the hand of the special services." 
(Moskovskaya pravda, 11 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-104) 
 
When prompted to comment on the former head of the Presidential Guards, 
Aleksandr Korzhakov, Mr. Berezovsky implicated him in the attempted 
assassination of former National Sports Foundation Chief Boris Fedorov and in 
the murder of Otari Kvantrishvili. 
 
Korzhakov has responded to the allegations by berating Berezovsky's habit of 
blaming "all Russia's misfortunes" on the security services, but his comments fell 
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well short of a refutation. (Komsomol'skaya pravda, 15 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
105) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
New appointments trickle in 
Sergei Kirienko, in consultation with president, has thus far made the following 
appointments to the government: 
April 22 Nikolai Khvatkov, Acting Chief of his Secretariat (Komsomol'skaya 
pravda, 24 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118) 
April 28 Boris Nemtsov, Deputy Prime Minister; Viktor Khristenko, Deputy 
Prime Minister; Mikhail Zadornov, Finance Minister; Igor Sergeev, Defense 
Minister; Yevgeni Primakov, Foreign Minister; Sergei Stepashin, Interior Minister 
;Sergei Shoigu, Minister for Emergency Situations; Nikolai Aksenenko, Railways 
Minister; Alex. Tikhonov, Education Minister (Interfax, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
118) 
April 30 Oleg Syusev, Deputy Chair; Yakov Urinson, Economics Minister; 
Pavel Krasheninnikov, Justice Minister; Viktor Semenev, Agriculture and Food 
Minister; Farit Gazizullin, State Property Minister; Vlad. Bulgak, Science and 
Technology Minister; Sergei Generalov, Fuel and Power Minister; Oksana 
Dmitrieva, Labor Minister; Natalia Dementieva, Culture Minister; Sergei Frank, 
Transportation Minister; Viktor Nekrutenko, Natural Resources Minister (RIA-
Novosti.com, 30 Apr 98) 
May 5  Ilya Yuzhankov, Minister for Land Policy, Construction and Housing 
(RIA-Novosti.com, 5 May 98) 
 May 8 Ivan Rybkin, Deputy Prime Minister and Special Presidential Envoy 
to the CIS; Georgi Gabuniya, Minister for Trade and Industry (Acting) (RTR, 8 
May 98;Monitor, 11 May 98) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Mark Jones 
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Russia supports Iraqi progress, wants nuclear papers closed 
Russia believes that the UN Security Council should take account of "the political 
results Iraq has already achieved in various areas, including in the nuclear 
sphere," Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin told a 30 April 
briefing. At the UN Security Council's meeting on Iraq on 27 April the Russian 
ambassador to the United Nations acknowledged considerable progress in 
regard to Baghdad destroying banned missile potential, and proposed in a draft 
document that the positive results achieved by Iraq be fixed to stopping 
international inspections of Iraq's sites related to nuclear programs and transition 
to long-term monitoring. (ITAR-TASS, 0746 GMT, 25 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-115, 
and Interfax, 1304 GMT, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-120) 
 
Russian-Iranian relations cool... 
A strain in Russian-Iranian relations developed when Kazakhstan's President 
Nursultan Nazarbaev signed an agreement with Russian President Boris Yel'tsin 
on the division of the Caspian Sea bed. Previously, Moscow and Iran held similar 
views on the issue, which stressed allocating an exclusive 45-mile area in the 
sea to each of five littoral states--Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, 
and Azerbaijan--and sharing the exploitation of the remainder of the world's 
largest lake. Russian officials had always referred to the close cooperation 
between Tehran and Moscow in codifying a legal regime for the Caspian Sea but 
abandoned that cooperation when the joint Kazakh-Russian document was 
signed. (Iran News, 12 Apr 98, p. 2; FBIS-NES-98-109) Prior to the signing of the 
Russian-Kazakh agreement on the Caspian issue, Iranian Ambassador to Russia 
Mehdi Safari said Iran's stand on the legal status of the Caspian Sea remains 
unchanged and that all issues concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea 
should be based on consensus. Iran does not recognize decision-making 
methods that do not take into account the stances taken by all of the littoral 
countries, the ambassador said. (Interfax, 1814 GMT, 24 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
115) 
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An "unofficial" response came from Tehran in the English-language daily Iran 
News editorial on 30 April, cautioning Russia about possible consequences of 
"ignoring Iran." The daily reacted to Russian-Kazakh agreement dividing the 
resources of the Caspian Sea bed without consulting the other littoral states. The 
editorial went on to state that to ignore Iran at the present juncture would be an 
error on the part of a Russia which desires to maintain its presence in Central 
Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East. (IRNA, 0730 GMT, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-
NES-98-120) 
 
...But they remain united on denials of weapons programs 
Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Mahmud Mohammadi on 28 April said that a 
shipment, bound for Iran from Russia, consisting of steel alloys weighing 22 
tonnes used in the construction of advanced missiles could also be used for 
peaceful purposes and was ordered possibly by a private Iranian firm. He stated 
that the "Iranian government has started its own investigation," and highlighted 
the futility of attempts to politicize the incident. He also used the statement to 
once again deny that Iran is seeking access to missile technologies from Russia. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0727 GMT, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-NES-98-119)  
 
Russian-Iranian cooperation in nuclear power engineering has "purely peaceful 
purposes and is in strict accordance with the Russian President's decisions and 
with the spirit and letter of the nonproliferation treaty," Russia's Acting Minister for 
Atomic Energy Yevgeni Adamov told US Under Secretary of State John Holum 
during an official visit to Moscow on 22 April.  
 
The ministry's press service highlighted the fact that Iran as signatory of the 
treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is entitled to the peaceful 
development of nuclear technology. The press service also highlighted the fact 
that Iran was "among the first countries to sign this international document and 
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put its nuclear activity under IAEA guarantees." (Interfax, 1803 GMT, 22 Apr 98; 
FBIS-TAC-98-112) 
 
Kosovo situation may lead to war; borders should be secured 
The secession of Kosovo from Serbia "may lead to a war that will be even worse 
than the one in Bosnia," Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov told a 
conference at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations on 28 April. He said the 
secession would contradict "the interests of Serbia, historical justice and the task 
of stabilizing the situation in the area" and that "Russia is most resolutely 
opposed to attempts to tear Kosovo away from Serbia." Instead, "Russia's efforts 
in the contact group are directed at beginning a dialogue between the authorities 
of Serbia and the leaders of Kosovo Albanians," he said. (Interfax, 0939 GMT, 28 
Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118) 
 
Primakov also said that in the contact group Russia is pressing to stop attempts 
to bring militants and arms across the border to Kosovo. According to him, the 
Russian side has reasons to believe Albania has camps for training terrorists 
who are later sent to Kosovo. The foreign minister also stressed that "borders 
should be secured to prevent infiltration of this kind both from Albania and from 
Macedonia, and we are submitting our representations in this respect." 
 
Comment 
Although Primakov recommends closing the borders, his plans to accomplish this 
are not clear. During previous interviews Primakov has repeatedly stressed the 
need to avoid deploying foreign troops to Kosovo to resolve the crisis. (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 0845 GMT, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118) 
 
Primakov concerned over Mideast peace deadlock 
Primakov told reporters on 20 April that everything possible should be done to 
take the Mideast peace process "out of its present difficult situation." He also 
expressed concern that attempts have recently been made to separate Lebanon 
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and Syria from the peace process. These statements were made at the 
conclusion of talks between Primakov and his Qatar counterpart which focused 
on the Mideast peace process as well as the current situation in Iraq. (Interfax, 
1324 GMT, 20 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-110) 
 
Comment 
Russia has recently been rebuilding Russian-Syrian relations partly in an attempt 
to play a role in the Mideast peace process and block US influence in the 
Mideast. The elimination of Syria from any formal negotiations in the Mideast 
would seriously undermine Primakov's foreign policy strategy for the area. 
 
Primakov leaving? They're only rumors 
Presidential press secretary Sergei Yastrzhembsky dismissed rumors of his 
intention to become Russia's foreign minister during a news conference in 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on 20 April. He referred to the rumors as speculation, stating 
that Primakov is doing a great job. He also noted the Russian diplomat's handling 
of the Iraqi crisis and the Kosovo situation as some of Primakov's recent 
successes and stated that, "the Foreign Ministry's policy is invariably supported 
by the president [and] thanks to it Russia [is] gradually establishing firm positions 
on the world arena."(Interfax, 1010 GMT, 20 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-110) 
 
Travel ban lifted on 50 'state secrets' holders 
The Russian foreign ministry on 14 April lifted travel restrictions on 50 citizens 
who were previously refused permission to travel abroad due to their knowledge 
of information that constituted state secrets. The foreign ministry said that, in 
accordance with current legislation, the commission lifted the restrictions on 
going abroad for the citizens and gave them the right to receive foreign 
passports. The commission left temporary restrictions in force for seven of the 
citizens who applied for permission to travel abroad. (Radiostantsiya Ekho 
Moskvy, 1150 GMT, 22 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-112) 
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Russia and China cooperation in nuclear power noted 
A Russian atomic energy ministry official announced in early April that 
preparations are underway for the joint construction of a nuclear power plant 
near Lianyungang, China (Xinhua, 7 Apr 98; FBIS-CHI-98-098).  
 
Another joint Russo-Chinese construction project, located near the Chinese city 
of Hanzhun, is also proceeding on schedule. The second phase of a three-stage 
project to build a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant is supposed to be 
completed by August of this year. The plant is expected to be fully operational by 
January 2002 (Interfax, 8 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-098). 
 
No neckties lead to little progress 
Russian President Boris Yel'tsin traveled to Japan for an informal "no neckties" 
meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in mid-April. The 
meeting was scheduled as a follow-up to last Fall's summit where Yel'tsin 
showed some flexibility on the Kurile Island issue and proclaimed that the 
countries should sign a formal peace treaty by the year 2000. At this month's 
meeting, Yel'tsin proposed an even broader agreement on "peace, friendship and 
cooperation" between the two countries, noting that a simple peace treaty is "too 
narrow." In short, very little progress was made on either the peace treaty or the 
Kurile Island dispute because Tokyo wishes to link both settlements while 
Moscow refuses to do so (ITAR-TASS, 18 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-108). 
 
Beating a hasty retreat 
Within five days of President Yel'tsin's informal summit with Hashimoto, the 
Russian foreign ministry began retracting its official position regarding a peace 
treaty between the two nations. Although prior to the meeting the official Moscow 
line was a treaty by 2000, foreign ministry spokesman Sergei Kastornonow is 
now saying that "It will be very difficult for Russia and Japan to find a mutually 
acceptable solution to the territorial problem by that time," and then concluded 
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that "a full-scale Russian Japanese treaty is unlikely to be completed by 2000" 
(Interfax, 22 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-112). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
ELECTIONS 
Recent regional elections returns 
Sverdlovsk: Fourteen vacancies in the local Duma were filled. Turnout was over 
37 percent in what has been described as a rough-and-tumble campaign. The 
populist governor of the region, Eduard Rossel, was disappointed by the returns 
as his party, Preobrazheniye Urala (Transformation of the Urals), won only 9.5 
percent of the vote. The most successful party was that of the Yekaterinburg 
mayor, Nash Dom-Nash Gorod (Our Home is Our City) which won 22 percent of 
the vote. A record 5,000 observers watched the election in addition to police 
posts set up to record violations as might occur. Vladimir Mostovshchikov, 
chairman of the regional electoral commission, admitted that a number of people 
were detained for giving voters (presumably alcoholic) drinks. (NTV, 1500 GMT, 
13 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-103) 
 
Lipetsk: The elections of the Regional Administration head in the Lipetsk region 
were won by Oleg Korolev, current chairman of the Regional Council of Deputies, 
with 79.38 percent. The incumbent, Mikhail Narolin, received only 13.81 percent. 
Korolev was supported by over 40 public organizations and parties, including 
Yabloko and Gennadi Zyuganov's Communist Party. 
 
Penza: The incumbent governor of the Regional Administration, Anatoli 
Kovlyagin, lost with only 13 percent of the vote. Yuri Bochkarev, the chief of 
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Penza's Zheleznodorozhny District, won with 60 percent of the vote. The Penza 
region's voters were to choose among five candidates. 
 
Nenets autonomous district, Arkhangelsk: The residents of the Nenets 
autonomous district have finally elected a deputy to the Arkhangelsk regional 
legislature after Nenets dropped its drive for "sovereignty." Of the eight 
contenders, the voters gave preference to Communist Aleksandr Sablin, who 
polled 28.56 percent of the vote. (ITAR-TASS, 0805 GMT, 13 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-103) 
 
Nikolaev elected from Moscow district to State Duma 
The former chief of Russia's Federal Border Service, Andrei Nikolaev, has been 
elected to the Duma from Moscow's Orekhovo-Borisovo one-candidate 
constituency. Nikolaev won with 62.5 percent of the vote. Total turnout was 35 
percent. Nikolaev resigned his military commission on 12 April so that he could 
enter the Duma as "citizen" Nikolaev. 
 
Unsuccessful candidates for the seat filed suit against Nikolaev in Moscow city 
court citing election violations, but the suit was dismissed. The candidates next 
turned to the Russian Supreme Court, which is to hear the case sometime this 
week. (ITAR-TASS, 0805 GMT, 13 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-103) 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Potential power of Constitutional Court discussed 
In an address to the nation before his trip to Japan in April, President Yel'tsin 
pointed to the importance of the 1993 constitution as the foundation of Russian 
society, and the role of the Constitutional Court as its guardian. "The role of the 
Constitutional Court is very important in defending the country's main law.... The 
main thing...is to ensure that all branches of power act in line with the law, 
respect the constitution, and strictly adhere to the Constitutional Court's decisions 
[which] are binding on everyone, including the President." But the president notes 
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that during times of reform, "it is very dangerous to change the Constitution." In 
fact, on 13 April 1998, the president pointed out that there will be "no changes to 
the Constitution while I am President." 
 
However, he also admits that there are glitches in the basic law which have 
become evident over time. For instance, who would become acting president 
should the president die or become incapacitated when there is no prime 
minister? This recently became an issue during the month-long struggle over 
Sergei Kirienko's nomination. (NTV, 1000 GMT, 13 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-103) 
 
The president's categorical dismissal of constitutional amendment means that 
only the Federal Assembly or the Constitutional Court must address the holes in 
the constitution. But as neither the Federal Assembly nor the court seems 
particularly capable of opposing the wishes of the president when he is most 
adamant, the constitution remains, as it was born, a function of his power. The 
president seems to forget that the Federal Assembly is also a constitutional 
institution, and that his consistent disregard for its rules and procedures harms 
his beloved constitution. (Interfax, 1413 GMT, 17 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-107) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Dwyer Dennis and CDR Curtis Stevens 
 
Rosvooruzhenie denies reports of shrinking revenues... 
Director General Yevgeni Ananev of Rosvooruzhenie reported to the Duma's 
Defense Committee that the state's arms trader had already received orders 
totaling more than $8.5 billion for work out to the year 2003. According to 
Interfax, sources have reported that the amount may exceed $9 billion by the end 
of 1998. During a press conference held after the closed-door session with the 
Duma, Ananev cited many examples and statistics to refute claims that arms 
sales revenues had actually shrunk; he gave Russian President Yel'tsin's August 
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1997 decree "On Measures to Strengthen State Control Over Cooperation for 
Trade in Arms and Related Services with Foreign Countries" credit for much of 
the success. Ananev said that, since 1996, the number of importers had grown 
from 49 countries to 58 and that planned arms exports for 1998 would be almost 
$3.5 billion. 
 
Ananev's primary argument was that the net gains due to arms sales have 
increased. During the press conference he pointed out that the former Soviet 
Union annually supplied weapons to countries with extremely limited budgets. He 
said that "our [Soviet] arms exports were an addition to our ideological 
expansion" and claimed that the practice of handing out arms for free had 
stopped. He compared 1997 arms exports proceeds of $2.5 billion to the Soviet 
arms exports in 1990 worth more than $16 billion but with gains of less than $900 
million. (Interfax, 1404 GMT, 16 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-106, and Interfax, 0903 
GMT, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118) 
 
At the heart of the issue, though, is the impact to the actual defense industry. 
Various sources have claimed that Rosvooruzhenie charges an overhead fee of 
anywhere between 10 to 50 percent for coordinating arms trade. One move to 
help alleviate this has been the approval of 14 defense enterprises to operate on 
foreign markets directly. This, however, has brought concerns from the Ministry 
of Defense regarding the marketing of leading technology and the resulting 
security issues. It is important to note also that $8.5-9 billion worth of contracts 
up to the year 2003 actually equates to less than $2 billion in sales per year. New 
contracts are sure to come in, but many on the books could also disappear or be 
drastically reduced given current financial trends in the ASEAN region, which 
was until recently one of Russia's expanding markets. 
 
...While Duma official warns of defense industry bankruptcies 
Stepan Sulakshin, president of the Russian fund for high tech development and 
deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for Industry, Construction, 
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Transport and Power Engineering, told an industry conference on 23 April that 
every other Russian defense enterprise is on the verge of bankruptcy. According 
to ITAR-TASS, Sulakshin said that the conversion of the military-industrial 
complex is not properly financed and not yielding positive results. Only 15.5 
percent of the budgeted funds (which were less than half of what was originally 
requested) were actually allocated for defense conversion in 1997. Civilian 
product output is three times lower in volume than four years ago. Further 
aggravating the problems is that the government is only financing 40 to 50 
percent of its contracted defense orders. Conference participants reportedly felt 
that all players, from high-tech developers to banks and leasing companies, need 
to work jointly towards a solution. Emphasis on transnational corporations was 
presented as a possible mechanism. (ITAR-TASS, 1416 GMT, 23 Apr 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-114) 
 
Additional evidence is accumulating which casts much of the Russian defense 
industry closer to death's door than the road to recovery. Two thousand workers 
at the Sokol aviation plant in Nizhni Novgorod were placed on compulsory four-
month leave on two-thirds pay. According to ITAR-TASS, only managers and 
specialists engaged in export production will keep working. While this situation 
may be an example of the current environment found in the Russian defense 
industry, it also indicates that drastic, but probably most necessary, actions are 
beginning to be taken. Chubais and Urinson have both previously stated that 
many enterprises will indeed shut down, since the state could no longer afford 
such a large, redundant industrial base. A rather satirical question concerning the 
compulsory leave does come to mind though, considering the still-demoralizing 
arrears problem that is rampant throughout the Russian defense industry. Is the 
two-thirds wages more or less than what the workers have been paid over the 
last year? 
 
Defense minister snubs NATO commander 
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Claiming he had a full schedule and was called away to a meeting at the 
Federation Council, Marshal Sergeev unexpectedly canceled a meeting with 
visiting NATO commander General Wesley Clark on 22 April. General Clark had 
met with chief of the Russian General Staff, Anatoli Kvashnin, on 20 April. Also in 
Russia, on an unrelated trip, was Italian Defense Minister Beniamino Andreatta. 
The Italian defense minister was received by the busy marshal and several 
military cooperation agreements were signed. (ITAR-TASS, 1302 GMT, 20 Apr 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-110, Jamestown Monitor, 23 Apr 98, and Jamestown Monitor, 
24 Apr 98) 
 
'Plotters' arrested in Volgograd Army Corps 
The Segodnya newscast reported several soldiers who were assigned to units in 
the North Caucasus district have been arrested for unspecified plots against the 
government. The North Caucasus Military District Commander, General Viktor 
Kazantsev, said the "threads stretch even to the State Duma." The chairman of 
the Duma Defense Committee, retired General Lev Rokhlin, had previously been 
the commanding general for several of the troops arrested. (NTV, 1800 GMT, 25 
Apr 98: FBIS-SOV-98-115) 
 
Comment 
During the summer and fall General Rokhlin was extremely active and outspoken 
in his opposition to President Yel'tsin and routinely called for the president's 
removal from office. He founded a group of retired and active duty officers and 
defense industrialists to speak out on the plight of the Russian military. Many of 
General Rokhlin's speeches came perilously close to advocating an overthrow of 
the government or having military forces take an active role in government in 
order to halt the decline of the Russian military. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
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Heads of State hold summit 
The twice postponed Heads of State meeting was finally held in Moscow on 29 
April. Unlike previous conferences, which often took up several days, this summit 
apparently only lasted three hours. In keeping with past meetings, the council 
failed to sign any significant documents and did not issue a joint communique at 
the end of the conference. Commenting on the failure to issue a joint statement, 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev said, "What is the sense if nothing is 
decided?" Nazarbaev went on to describe the summit as "totally empty" and 
"leading nowhere." 
 
The issue of establishing an "interstate forum," first put forward by Ukrainian 
President Kuchma and Yel'tsin after their bilateral meeting last month--and one of 
the main agenda items--was shelved until at least July. The question of CIS 
military cooperation and planning through the year 2001 was also postponed due 
to a lack of consensus among the presidents. The Russian-sponsored 
"Declaration on the Further Development of Equitable Partnership and 
Cooperation in the CIS" was also voted down due to objections from Ukraine, 
Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan because it did not contain 
language confirming the territorial integrity of CIS member states. Russian 
initiatives were not the only ones to receive short shrift. President Nazarbaev's 
proposal to create a single CIS economic space and a free trade zone was also 
rejected (Intelnews, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-120, Jamestown Monitor, 30 Apr 
98, and ITAR-TASS, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119).  
 
Commonwealth leadership posts filled 
The biggest shock to come out of the CIS summit was the appointment of 
Russian businessman Boris Berezovsky as CIS executive secretary. Berezovsky 
takes the post from Belarusian Ivan Korotchenya, who held it since 1991 when 
the secretariat was known as the CIS working group. Berezovsky's appointment 
may be seen as a shift in policy for Moscow from an attempt to dominate the CIS 
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politically and militarily to a policy which recognizes economic dominance as the 
critical locus. If there were any question of the extent to which Korotchenya was 
Yel'tsin's lapdog, the Russian president promised to find the dismissed secretary 
an "equal post" in the future. It will be interesting to see if that post materializes in 
the Russian government (Interfax, 1028 GMT, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119). 
 
Boris Yel'tsin was again elected to the post of chairman of the Council of Heads 
of State, this time until the year 2000. In a somewhat surprising move--in that it 
actually fulfills the requirement of the CIS charter to rotate leadership positions--
Uzbek Prime Minister Utkir Sultanov was elected chairman of the Council of 
Heads of Government and Aueznur Kazhenov was appointed to preside over the 
CIS Economic Court. Now that Berezovsky has been named executive secretary, 
it is likely that power will begin flowing away from these councils and toward the 
secretariat. Therefore, these non-Russian appointments may be strictly 
ceremonial (Interfax, 1028 GMT, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119). 
 
Major General Sergei Korobko's status as commander of CIS peacekeeping 
forces in Georgia was confirmed by the heads of state. Korobko has been 
serving as acting commander of the unit for several months after President 
Shevardnadze requested the expulsion of the old commander for "taking sides" 
in the Abkhazian conflict (ITAR-TASS, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119). 
 
Russia guts its CIS bureaucracy 
Russian Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko's government reforms have destroyed 
the special status previously enjoyed by Russia's CIS bureaucracy. When 
Kirienko reduced the number of deputy premier slots to three, he eliminated the 
post of deputy premier for CIS affairs, the position Ivan Rybkin filled just last 
month. He then abolished the CIS cooperation ministry, leaving Anatoli 
Adamishin, who took the post approximately six months ago, without a job. The 
functions of the ministry are being transferred to the foreign ministry, and 
probably to First Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov, who has said that, 
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although several commonwealth countries have pursued friendly relations with 
capitols other than Moscow, "We shall not allow this process to develop to the 
detriment of Russia's interests" (Jamestown Monitor, 1 May 98, and Interfax, 30 
Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-120). 
 
Special services' chiefs meet 
Russian Federal Security Service director Nikolai Kovalev chaired the third 
meeting of the CIS council of special services' chiefs in Yerevan a few days prior 
to the Heads of State meeting. Representatives of all countries except Azerbaijan 
attended. Kovalev ended the session by saying, "We have come to the 
unambiguous conclusion that it is necessary to unite efforts and will do our 
utmost towards this end." He also reported that 15 documents had been signed 
and, although their contents were classified, at least a few dealt with the "military 
technical aspect" of cooperation.  
 
The conference, mirroring previous meetings, addressed procedures to combat 
terrorism, organized crime, economic crimes and illegal migration. An agreement 
to exchange information on the movements of known members of terrorist 
organizations was approved and additional work on the joint data bank 
developed last year was completed (ITAR-TASS, 27-28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
116 and FBIS-SOV-98-117; Snark, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118). 
 
CIS peacekeeping zone extended--again 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze said that the CIS decided to expand 
the Russian peacekeepers' patrol zone in Georgia. A similar decree was issued 
last March by the heads of state but was never enforced. This time the order 
comes from the CIS Collective Security Council (formed in Tashkent in 1992) and 
was not addressed at the Heads of State summit. It is improbable, however, that 
the new order will meet with any more success than the previous one (Interfax, 
1512 GMT, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119). 
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The 'Four' become 'Five' 
Prime ministers from the "Group of Four" (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan) held a meeting chaired by Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kubanychbeck 
Zhumaliev on 28 April in Moscow. The group spent most of its time discussing 
how best to forge a single economic space in the CIS. The main event at the 
meeting was the inclusion of Tajikistan as a full member. The council also agreed 
to adopt Kazakh President Nazarbaev's "Ten Simple Steps" as the model for 
future economic integration. The steps include mutual recognition of university 
diplomas and scientific degrees, as well as simplification of money transfers and 
postal deliveries. They also call for allowing free passage across state borders, 
and simplifying the procedure for gaining citizenship. 
 
The council adopted a treaty on the legal status of citizens of one country 
permanently living in another member state, stipulating that such citizens are not 
subject to restrictions on their rights or "additional obligations which may be set 
for foreign citizens in the receiving country." The group also decided to move its 
headquarters from Moscow to Almaty (ITAR-TASS, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
118, and Interfax, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118). Despite their work, however, 
the heads of state decided not to adopt further economic integration for the entire 
CIS. Nazarbaev's plan, therefore, will only be used by "The Five." 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Regions 
By Tracy Gerstle 
 
MOLDOVA 
New Alliance for Democratic Reforms holds a majority in the parliament  
After almost five weeks of political maneuvering the right-wing Democratic 
Convention of Moldova (CDM) and the Party of Democratic Forces (PFD) signed 
an agreement with the pro-presidential Bloc for Democratic and Prosperous 
Moldova (BMDP) to form the ruling Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR). 
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By joining ranks they effectively quashed any hopes that Moldova's Communist 
Party retained to dominate the parliament with its 41 seats. The ADR's combined 
total is 60 seats. 
 
The ADR was made possible by the reconciliation of Moldova's President Petru 
Lucinschi and his predecessor Mircea Snegur, head of the Party of Rebirth and 
Conciliation, which joined forces with the Moldovan Popular Front to form the 
CDM for the parliamentary elections. (Infotag, 1800 GMT, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-118) The two had not met since Lucinschi assumed office on 15 January 
1997. Snegur said that the three parties had to disregard their ideological 
differences, since the "next four years would be hard" ones in order to solve 
Moldova's economic crisis. (Rompress, 1420 GMT, 27 Apr 98; FBIS-EEU-98-
117) 
 
However, this arrangement is one of convenience rather than genuine 
reconciliation of party platforms. The first cracks in the alliance appeared over 
negotiations for Moldova's new prime minister. The CDM won the right to name 
the new prime minister after ceding the parliament's chairmanship to the BMPD's 
candidate, Dumitru Diacov. Infighting broke out in the CDM when Snegur's group 
protested the Popular Front's nomination of parliament deputy and economist 
Valentin Dolganiuc. President Lucinschi also protested the nomination, saying he 
preferred someone who had no prior strong political affiliations. (Basapress, 2000 
GMT, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-121) When it became clear that the Popular 
Front would not name a new candidate, Snegur allied himself with the BMPD in 
favor of current Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc, who with his cabinet had formally 
resigned last week. Ciubuc was instructed by President Lucinschi to form a new 
government on 6 May. (Jamestown Monitor, 7 May 98) 
 
In the Gagauz-Yeri autonomous oblast the new coalition has not been widely 
recognized. In its stead the region's parliamentarians are seeking to form a new 
party. Halk Birlii, leader of the Unity of the People Party, said that the new party 
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would be "aimed at uniting patriots of the (oblast)...and South Moldova in order to 
avoid a union between Moldova and Romania." During the parliamentary 
elections the Constitutional Court vetoed a proposal by the oblast's parliament to 
hold simultaneously a referendum on a constitution for the region. (Basapress, 
1600 GMT, 24 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-116) 
 
Transdniestr's hopes to join Russian-Belarusian Union vetoed 
At the recent CIS summit in Moscow, Russia's President Boris Yel'tsin and 
Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma issued a joint statement disapproving of a region-wide 
poll in Transdniestr on the regions joining the Russian-Belarusian Union. The poll 
is being run by a local pro-union movement, with the assistance of Alexandru 
Caraman, Transdniestr's vice president, from 25 April through 15 May. 
(Basapress, 2000 GMT, 30 Apr 98: FBIS-SOV-98-121) 
 
This statement in support of Moldova's claim to the region contradicts reports by 
Bender city's Mayor Fedor Dobrov, who says he attended talks on Transdniestr 
joining the union at the ministry level in both Minsk and Moscow. He said that 
Transdniestr hopes to achieve observer status in the Union soon, as have some 
Armenian and Ukrainian political groups. (Infotag, 1600 GMT, 24 Apr 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-114) 
 
BELARUS 
Hints of the Soviet era still abound... 
At the annual May Day parade many persons took to the streets of Minsk holding 
pictures of Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka above their heads and 
with slogans one could have seen in Moscow's Red Square 12 to 15 years ago: 
"No to War, but Yes to Meat and Sugar." (NTV, 1200 GMT, 1 May 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-121) 
 
The Soviet-esque march followed a meeting Lukashenka held with state officials 
four days previously, during which he demanded that they "improve their 
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efficiency." Lukashenka cited polls in which 60 percent of Belarusians believed 
bureaucrats are "indifferent to people and nearly half said... (the authorities) were 
engaged in red tape and lacked general culture." He said that a team of 
Belarusian scientists had been gathered to create an ideology of the state that 
would direct and inspire citizens in "constructive work." As in the days of the 
Soviet Union, propagandists in charge of ideological activities have been 
assigned to large state-owned factories and farms. (Interfax, 1624 GMT, 27 Apr 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-117) 
 
Russian youth join the Belarusian opposition in protest 
During a 25 April rally to commemorate Belarus's Chernobyl victims, plainclothes 
policemen detained between 30 to 40 demonstrators. Included among the 
detainees were 15 Russian minors, some as young as 14 years old. They are 
members of the Moscow-based Antifascist Youth action. Their leader, Petru 
Kaznacheev, said at the rally that the group came to Minsk because "Belarus had 
become an island of dictatorship and turned into an ordinary police state." 
(Belapan, 1409 GMT, 26 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-116) The following day the group 
was deported to the Russian town Smolensk. They were accompanied on a train 
by a Belarusian security convoy. 
 
Progress of Union lagging 
During a visit to Moscow for the CIS Summit, Lukashenka spoke to a group of 
students at Moscow's Literary Institute. He told them that Russia was not yet 
ready for a "full-fledged union" with Belarus. He criticized the slowness of 
unification, citing hundreds of signed agreements that had yet to be 
implemented. Lukashenka said cooperation was vital and that he could not "be 
indifferent to what is going on in Russia. If Russia sinks, everybody else will." 
(Interfax, 1448 GMT, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118) The next day in a meeting 
with Lukashenka, Russian President Boris Yel'tsin said he believed that relations 
between the two states were progressing "well enough." (ITAR-TASS, 0946 
GMT, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98- 118)  
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UKRAINE 
Tarasyuk's pro-NATO statements 
Boris Tarasyuk, Ukraine's new foreign minister, is already out campaigning for 
Ukraine's closer integration with the West. In an interview with Uryadovyy Kuryer 
just prior to his appointment, he emphasized that "NATO remains the only 
security structure which has the means to maintain peace in Europe." Tarasyuk 
stated that Ukraine and even Russia should consider joining the organization. 
 
In the same interview he said Ukraine's "long term strategic goal was EU 
membership." At this time, however, he believes that Ukraine is not ready to join 
the economic union, since the country lacks the necessary infrastructure and 
bureaucratic apparatus to maintain the EU's standards. (Uryadovyy Kuryer, 18 
Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119) 
 
Punches thrown in fight for new speaker in Crimea's parliament 
As the new Crimean parliament convened in Simferopol on 29 April, protesters 
stood outside demanding Communist candidate Leonid Grach be appointed 
parliament speaker after Crimean Prime Minister Anatoli Franchuk tried to have 
him barred from running. Inside the parliament, the dispute evolved into a fist 
fight. Franchuk supports the reelection of former speaker Anatoli Gritsenko. 
Grach accused Franchuk of attempting to place his own puppet in the post, and 
promised that if elected he would immediately dismiss the PM. (Intelnews, 0149 
GMT, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-120) 
 
As of 5 May the dispute had not been settled, although the Communists had 
appealed to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, the Rada and the CIS 
Interparliamentary Assembly to intervene. (Jamestown Monitor, 5 May 98) 
 
Cooperation is always rewarded 
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On 6 May the United States signed an agreement with Ukraine enabling it to 
produce its own nuclear fuel for reactors. Currently Ukraine purchases fuel rods 
from Russia. The deal is said to be worth $30 million. The initiative is clearly a 
reward for Ukraine's backing out of its prior contract with Russia to provide 
turbines to a nuclear power plant in Iran. (Jamestown Monitor, 6 May 98) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
Defense minister resigns amid sabotage charges 
Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze resigned on 27 April amid charges of failing 
to provide military escort planes for the presidential plane. At the same time, it 
became publicly known that military personnel were suspected of involvement in 
the 9 February attempt to assassinate President Shevardnadze.  
 
On 27 April, Shevardnadze revealed that all of Georgia's tanks in the vicinity of 
Tbilisi were sabotaged on the day of the assassination attempt. The tanks had 
been drained of motor oil and hence could not have been used to secure the 
capital had the assassination attempt succeeded. Shevardnadze disclosed that 
"the brother of one of the terrorists was the commander of that tank battalion," 
and indicated that an investigation was underway. (Radio Tbilisi Network, 0800 
GMT, 27 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-117) 
 
The defense minister's resignation was linked specifically with the sabotage of 
Georgian planes while they were being serviced at a Russian base. The planes 
were supposed to provide escort for the presidential plane during 
Shevardnadze's trip to Turkey but were disabled when sand and stones were 
placed in their engines. Neither the Georgian prosecutor, Badri Bitsadze, nor the 
president blamed Russia for the incident. Instead they emphasized that the 
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servicing of the planes was a routine procedure that should not have taken place 
at the Russian bases at all. (Radio Rossii, 1800 GMT, 27 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
117) The former defense minister has not been formally charged with any crime; 
on the contrary, Shevardnadze praised his accomplishments at reorganizing the 
Georgian military. At least thus far, Nadibaidze has not fled to Russia. 
 
The new defense minister, Colonel Davit Tevzade, served previously as the head 
of the Main Military Inspection of the Georgian Armed Forces General Staff. He 
earned a Ph.D. in philosophy from Tbilisi University. A native of Sukhumi, he 
joined the armed forces in 1992 as a battalion commander and rose to brigade 
leader during the war with Abkhazia. In 1994-95 he attended courses at the 
NATO military college in Rome and in 1996-97 attended classes at the military 
college of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. (ITAR-TASS, 1711 GMT, 27 Apr 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-117, and ITAR-TASS, 1712 GMT, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118) 
 
After Tevzade was confirmed by parliament, Shevardnadze promoted him to the 
rank of major-general and introduced him to the ministry staff on 30 April. 
(Interfax, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-120) Shevardnadze emphasized the following 
as the most important and immediate challenges for the armed forces: 
• Improvements in living conditions for military servicemen 
• Making military service as safe as possible 
• Further restructuring and "borrow[ing] the best from international military 
practice" 
• Expanding contacts with CIS states and within the bounds of the NATO 
PfP program 
• Expanding cooperation with the armies of other countries in the Caucasus 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
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KAZAKHSTAN 
Russia, Kazakhstan settle differences on Caspian division and Baikonur 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev and Russian President Boris Yel'tsin met 
in Moscow on 28 April to sign a statement on their agreement over the division of 
the Caspian Sea bed. The two presidents will sign a formal agreement on the 
seabed's division in early July. The statement also called for the leaders of all the 
other littoral states to make greater efforts to reach an agreement on the sea's 
legal status (Interfax, 1158 GMT, 28 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-118). The Kazakh 
and Russian presidents were able to resolve most of their differences over the 
division of the Caspian Sea's resources at a 9 April meeting in Moscow, where 
they agreed that, although the seabed should be divided into national sectors 
along median lines, the sea's surface should not be divided and should be 
demilitarized (Interfax, 1809 GMT, 9 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-099). Agreements on 
shipping and fishing rights and on environmental considerations will need to be 
addressed by all of the littoral states together (Interfax, 0935 GMT, 20 Apr 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-110). 
 
The two presidents were also able to reach an initial settlement of the Baikonur 
lease agreement. President Yel'tsin agreed that the Russian government should 
pay $115 million for its use of the Baikonur space station in 1998. The $460 
million which the Russian government owes for its lease of the facilities over the 
past four years will be repaid in increments, once the two countries' governments 
have agreed on how to restructure the debt (ITAR-TASS, 0704 GMT, 21 Apr 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-111). 
 
Kazakhstan adopts plan for nuclear energy development 
On 14 April, the Kazakh government approved a draft program for the 
development of its nuclear energy sector. The draft calls for three nuclear 
reactors to be built at Lake Balkhash, each capable of supplying 640 megawatts 
of electricity. These reactors are to provide electricity mainly for Kazakhstan's 
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southern regions, which are currently dependent on Uzbek power supplies. The 
draft program also proposes that additional nuclear reactors be built in Almaty, 
Akmola, and Ust-Kamenogorsk (Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 15 Apr 98, p. 1; FBIS-
TAC-98-110). 
 
The Lake Balkhash reactors are to begin producing electricity in 2005. US $440 
million have been allocated for the construction of the reactors, which are to be 
Russian VVER-type reactors. The Kazakh government intends to raise the 
necessary funds for the Balkhash complex's construction principally by selling 
weapons-grade uranium to Russia (ITAR-TASS, 1140 GMT, 23 Apr 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-113). 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
90% of UTO troops registered, but only 40% have disarmed 
On 29 April, Mizrob Kabirov, state advisor to President Rahmonov, announced to 
the Interfax news agency that approximately 4,000 United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO) troops are now registered and stationed in special training camps, in 
compliance with the terms of the peace agreement's military protocol. According 
to Kabirov's calculations, this means that at least 90 percent of the UTO's units 
have been registered. Those opposition troops who are considered physically fit 
enough are to be integrated eventually into Tajikistan's national army. The 
implementation of the measures specified in the military protocol is six months 
behind schedule, but Kabirov stated that the process would be completed by 1 
July, in line with the deadline set by the International Contact Group at its 28 April 
meeting. 
 
The International Contact Group (its members are the ambassadors of the 
various countries which have agreed to guarantee the implementation of the 
peace agreement) also unanimously called for the already much-delayed 
repatriation of the 500 UTO troops who remain in Afghanistan to be carried out 
no later than 25 May. Plans for how to transport these UTO troops and their 
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weapons across the border (via the Lower Panj checkpoint) and to their bases in 
the Garm and Tavildora regions were still under discussion by representatives of 
the Tajik government, the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), the UTO, 
the command of the CIS Joint Peacekeeping Forces, and the UN mission 
(Interfax, 0704 GMT, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-UMA-98-119). 
 
Another cause for concern among the members of the International Contact 
Group, and of the various international agencies which are involved in carrying 
out the terms of the peace agreement, is the fact that although nearly all of the 
UTO troops may now be registered, more than half of their arms have not. Thus 
far, only 40 percent of the UTO troops' weapons have been registered, according 
to a statement released by members of the UN Observer Mission on 29 April 
(Interfax, 1241 GMT, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119). 
 
Comment 
The huge influx of weapons into Tajikistan caused by the civil war is most likely 
the leading cause for the rising rate of violent crimes in the country, especially in 
and around Dushanbe, which is currently host to representatives of several 
different political and military factions. 
 
Slow progress in the peace agreement's political protocol 
On 25 April, a UTO representative announced to the press that Said Abdullo 
Nuri, the leader of the UTO and chairman of the NRC, had sent a letter to 
President Rahmonov nominating another eight opposition members to posts in 
the Tajik government. Nuri has proposed that these opposition members be 
appointed to head two ministries and five government organizations and also to 
fill another deputy prime minister's post. The names of the nominees were not 
identified (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 25 Apr 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-115). 
 
New clashes reported in Kofarnihon and near Dushanbe 
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According to a Tajik defense ministry spokesman, government forces (Tajik 
defense ministry troops) were attacked by UTO troops on 29 April outside 
Rokhaty, a village located 10 kilometers east of Dushanbe, after they refused to 
meet the opposition group's demand that they abandon their post. The 
government troops eventually withdrew to a nearby military block post, but the 
UTO units again opened fire on them in the early evening. The government 
troops returned fire, and were subsequently joined by reinforcements from 
Dushanbe. Clashes between the two groups continued into the morning of the 
following day (Interfax, 0728 GMT, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-120). 
 
On the morning of 30 April, a large group of UTO troops attacked a Tajik defense 
ministry post in Kofarnihon, on the highway leading to Dushanbe. An unknown 
number of casualties were reported on both sides, as well as injuries to civilians. 
The same morning attacks were also reported on a border troop unit, an interior 
ministry troop detachment, and on three police posts. According to Radio 
Tajikistan, all of these attacks were launched by UTO units (Radio Tajikistan 
Second Channel Network, 1400 GMT, 30 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-120). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
LATVIA 
Changes come about in citizenship law 
The For the Fatherland and Freedom /LNNK faction finally acceded to pressure 
from fellow government coalition members, international agencies, and the 
wishes of much of Latvia's population in early May by agreeing to a loosening of 
the country's citizenship law. On 6 May the government announced a change in 
the law that will grant citizenship to all children born in Latvia after 21 August 
1991 regardless of their parents' citizenship, provided the parents have been 
living legally in Latvia for at least five years. (RFE/RL Newsline, 7 May 98) 
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According to the agreement that formed the ruling coalition government, changes 
to the law on citizenship were possible only by unanimous agreement of all 
coalition members. For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK had consistently 
been the holdout in any discussion of the citizenship law, seeking instead to 
toughen existing citizenship requirements. Apparently increased pressure from 
the international community--spurred by heightened tensions in Latvian-Russian 
relations since the beginning of March--and an awareness of Latvia's tenuous 
position without support from outside the Baltic area brought about the change of 
mind. 
 
Relations between Latvia and Russia could not have been termed "good" for 
several years. The chief reason stated publicly has been the large, primarily 
Russian-speaking, non-citizen population in Latvia. Russia repeatedly used the 
existence of approximately 200,000 non-citizens in attempts to influence Latvia's 
domestic policy and to force--through international pressure--blanket 
naturalization of the entire population. (As has been noted in previous digests, 
while an estimated 121,000 non-citizens were eligible to apply for naturalization 
in 1997, only 2,994 did so, according to Elizenija Aldermane, head of the 
naturalization department. Moreover, Aldermane reported that less than five 
percent of applicants were denied due to insufficient command of the language 
or knowledge of Latvian history. See ISCIP Editorial Digest, 4 February 1998). 
Russia's oft-cited charges of human rights violations were never proven; in fact, 
international observers refuted the claims. As recently as February a member of 
a group of visiting French MPs described such allegations as Russian 
propaganda which no one in Europe took seriously. (BNS Daily Report, 1600 
GMT, 14 Feb 98) 
 
What non-citizens do lack primarily are certain political rights. Still, it appears this 
lack of political rights means more to Russia than it does to the non-citizens 
themselves. A study on the formation of a civic society in Latvia, prepared by the 
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Baltijas Datu Nams company, demonstrated that the main reasons behind the 
slow naturalization of non-citizens included uncertainty about their ability to pass 
the language and history examinations, lack of interest, and alienation from the 
state. Although the requirements of the naturalization tests were cited as primary 
reasons behind the slow pace of naturalization, however, two-thirds of the alien 
population admitted that they were not personally acquainted with test 
requirements and knew nothing about the documents needed. (BNS Daily 
Report, 1700 GMT, 18 Mar 98). In addition, it seems as though the intransigence 
of For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK is not shared by the population at 
large: The study showed that 82 percent of citizens and 95 percent of non-
citizens supported the naturalization of aliens' children, while the option of 
naturalizing all persons who were born in Latvia has the support of 56 percent of 
citizens and 91 percent of non-citizens. (BNS, 1100 GMT, 19 Mar 98) 
 
Unfortunately, a series of events in the past couple of months provided Russia 
with ammunition in its public relations war against Latvia: Police forcibly 
dispersed a rally of over 1,000 elderly, mostly Russian-speaking, picketers in the 
capital after main thoroughfares had been blocked (no injuries were reported); a 
parade and gathering to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the Latvian SS 
legion was held in Riga and attended by some government officials, although 
their participation was unsanctioned (Radio Riga Network, 1000 GMT, 16 Mar 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-075); and bombs damaged a Riga synagogue (BNS Daily 
Report, 1100 GMT, 2 Apr 98), the Russian embassy (BNS Daily Report, 1400 
GMT, 6 Apr 98) and a monument to Russian World War II soldiers in Dobele 
(Interfax, 0808 GMT, 5 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-125). During a meeting of the 
OSCE permanent council in Vienna, Russia's attempts to characterize the rally 
dispersal as ethnic discrimination met with little support--most members saw the 
police action as being aimed at the restoration of public order. Only Belarus 
accepted Russia's stance. (BNS Daily Report, 1700 GMT, 12 Mar 98). Russia 
then submitted a draft resolution on the situation in Latvia to the UN Commission 
on Human Rights in Geneva (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1349 GMT, 2 Apr 98; 
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FBIS-SOV-98-092). The resolution went nowhere. When attempts to draw 
international censure against Latvia failed, Russia turned to economic threats--a 
move which earned a rebuke from the OSCE. While calling on Latvia to review its 
attitude toward national minorities, Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, 
the OSCE chairman, stated at a news conference on 15 April that Russia had 
overreacted, and that the OSCE was dissatisfied with the policy of sanctions. 
(Radio Riga Network, 0900 GMT, 15 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-105) Foreign 
ministers of the Nordic countries and representatives of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) also condemned Russia's policy of 
economic pressure. (Radio Riga Network, 1100 GMT, 22 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
112, and Radio Riga Network, 1700 GMT, 29 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-119) 
 
While Russia was unable to bring down international condemnation upon Latvia, 
the heightened tensions did result in strong comments from international players 
which no doubt led to the 6 May action by the government. The citizenship law 
change followed the recommendation of OSCE High Commissioner for Ethnic 
Nationalities Max van der Stoel, a regular visitor to Latvia, who had been 
suggesting changes in Latvia's citizenship and language law for quite a while. 
More recently, van der Stoel upped the ante, warning Latvia that the country 
risked international isolation if it continued to ignore OSCE advice. (BNS Daily 
Report, 1700 GMT, 31 Mar 98) A few days later, former US Deputy Secretary of 
State Richard Holbrooke visited Riga and advised Latvia to continue to examine 
the citizenship issue. (BNS Daily Report, 1700 GMT, 2 Apr 98) At about the 
same time, van der Stoel was able to note increasing support for his 
recommendations in the Saeima. (BNS Daily Report, 1900 GMT, 2 Apr 98) By 
mid-April the three largest factions in parliament--Latvian Way, For the 
Fatherland and Freedom, and Saimnieks--had agreed to offer the opportunity for 
naturalization to children of non-citizens once they reached the age of 16 and 
had passed the language test or completed schooling in Latvian. (Radio Riga 
Network, 1500 GMT, 14 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-104) Moreover, during a 
discussion between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Latvia's 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs Valdis Birkavs in Washington, DC, Talbott reportedly 
also weighed in on the side of the OSCE recommendations. (Radio Riga 
Network, 2000 GMT, 24 Apr 98; FBIS-SOV-98-115) 
 
One must tread carefully when examining these developments, however. 
Although in the end, Russia did manage to succeed in applying pressure to affect 
Latvian domestic policy, the international community cannot be assumed to have 
fallen for Russia's line. The aim of such players as the OSCE, the UN, and others 
seems to be a refusal to allow either Latvia or Russia to become so entrenched 
in rhetoric that all chances for good relations evaporate. 
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